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Abstract 
 
We explore the effects of capital mobility on the relationship between saving and investment 
using historical data for Iceland. First, we analyse the saving-investment (S-I) correlation for 
the period of restricted capital mobility using data from 1960 and 1994. We then add a period 
of free capital mobility between 1994 and 2008 and estimate the correlation for the period 
1960-2008. Finally, we extend our analysis to the 2008 to 2016 period, when capital controls 
were imposed in response to the crisis. Institutions matter: We find institutional changes, in 
particular Iceland’s entry into the European Single Market in 1994, coincided with a fall in 
the long-run correlation between saving and investment. However, the correlation weakens 
further when we include the post-crisis regime of capital controls, suggesting a weaker 
relationship between savings and investment in this regime. We discuss the possible reasons 
for this pattern and also the implications of our findings for post-crisis policy in small open 
economies. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper explores the relationship between saving and investment in one of the countries 
most affected by the recent global financial crisis. Iceland experienced large capital inflows 
during a credit boom from 2004 to 2008 that created a credit-led expansion of the economy, 
an appreciation of the currency and large current account deficits ending in a collapse of its 
financial system when the inflows stopped suddenly in the autumn of 2008 (see Calvo, 1998, 
on sudden stops). The period of free capital flows ended when capital controls were imposed 
as part of an IMF programme in November 2008.1 The controls were intended to stop the 
outflow of capital, hence enabling Iceland to have lower interest rates during the financial 
restructuring that was necessary in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Theoretically, the relationship between saving and investment is expected to be strong in 
regimes of capital controls or in regimes of low capital mobility. However, an important 
question is whether this also holds in a regime of capital controls in a country that 
experienced a sudden stop and a collapse of its financial system as was the case in Iceland. 
While investigating the relationship between saving and investment, known as the Feldstein-
Horioka (FH) hypothesis, the vast empirical literature draws no distinction between capital 
controls in normal times and capital controls during and after a financial crisis. Part of our 
contribution is to make this distinction as well as to give an historical overview of the 
relationship between capital controls, saving and investment in Iceland.  
The history of capital inflow regimes in Iceland provides a good testing ground to explore 
whether the economic effects of capital controls (imposed in response to a sudden stop) differ 
from those capital controls that historically prevailed during more normal times. Iceland, 
being a very small country, has not received a great deal of attention in the previous literature 
on the FH hypothesis. A few studies that considered Iceland have only included it in a panel 
of advanced countries without highlighting its historical regime shifts.2 The panel estimation 
strategy is not able to address the issue of historical phases of capital controls and capital 
mobility in Iceland satisfactorily, highlighting the importance of country specific analyses 
such as ours. 
We, for the first time, take advantage of Iceland’s extraordinary economic turbulence and 
test whether the effect of capital controls on the saving-investment relationship depends on 
the level of economic turmoil. We focus on three major regimes; a period of limited capital 
                                                          
1 See Benediktsdottir et al. (2011), Hreinsson et al. (2011), Nielsson and Torfason (2012) and Johnsen (2014) on 
Iceland’s financial crisis.  
2 See, e.g., Keun-Yeob et al. (1999), Katsimi and Zoega (2016), and Raza et al. (2018b). 
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mobility lasting from 1960 to 1994, a period of free capital mobility starting in 1994 when 
Iceland joined the European Union’s single market and ending in 2008 and, finally, a period 
of capital controls reintroduced during a financial crisis in 2008 that were just relaxed in the 
spring of 2017.  
Our findings indicate that the economic effects of recent capital controls (imposed in 
response to a sudden stop) differ from those capital controls that historically prevailed prior to 
1994, as will be discussed. Our paper is the first attempt to distinguish between the effects of 
capital controls imposed in response to a financial crisis from the effect of capital controls that 
were used in more normal circumstances, i.e., before Iceland joined the European Single 
Market. We find that saving and investment are very weakly related during the recent period 
of crisis and capital controls. The reason for this weak relationship is that damaged balance 
sheets and general uncertainty about the future hampered investment for a number of years 
while saving increased for the same reason making the two series diverge. The collapse of the 
financial system added to this effect by removing the channel from savings to investment 
projects. Thus, despite strong capital controls the relationship between savings and investment 
is very weak as compared to the period of restricted capital mobility in normal times. 
The debate about the effectiveness of capital controls is not new, and the understanding 
of capital controls is not very clear. Ghosh and Qureshi (2016) argue that economists have 
become generally more sceptical towards the implementation of capital controls. The 
explanation they put forward is that capital controls have normally been seen from a political 
perspective, where they are historically associated with autocratic, repressive, or failing 
regimes. The deliberate implementation of capital controls as an economic policy tool to 
reduce volatility and reclaim control over domestic capital flows are less well understood. In 
this regard, our work also contributes to the emerging literature on the economic effectiveness 
of capital controls, summarized in Fernandéz et al. (2015).  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Icelandic crisis with a 
focus on different regimes of capital mobility. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology 
used in analysing the relationship between saving and investment. Section 4 discusses the 
results of the model. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. History of economic growth and capital flow regimes 
A century ago, Iceland (pop. ~353,000) was one of the poorest countries in Europe and 
amongst the least financially developed countries until the privatisation of its banks and the 
deregulation of the financial sector in the 1990s. From a traditional economy, with two-thirds 
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of the labour force employed in agriculture, Iceland over a period of one century became one 
of the advanced economies with two-thirds of its labour force employed in the service sector, 
fitting well into its Nordic group. Icelandic GDP per capita in 2017 exceeded that of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden.3  
Table 1 shows the Icelandic economy experiencing higher average real economic growth 
during the post-World War II period than the average for Europe and the OECD countries. 
The growth in the economy was largely at the extensive margin – caused by an increase in 
inputs into production – driven by advances in the fishing fleet, the extension of the fishing 
limits (expanding from 3 miles in 1904 to 200 miles in 1976) and the utilisation of 
hydroelectric and geothermal energy. For most of the 20th century, unemployment rates were 
kept low and the country experienced very high and persistent inflationary pressures as 
compared to other OECD countries (Andersen and Guðmundsson 1998). The inflation was 
caused by a lack of a nominal anchor and an effective monetary policy on top of regular 
supply shocks in a small economy that based its livelihood mainly on fishing. 
      
 Figure 1: Real economic growth 
Period 1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Europe - 3.4 4.9 3.7 2.4 2.3 2.4 
OECD - 3.6 5.1 4.3 2.9 2.7 2.7 
Iceland 3.8 4.1 4.3 6.5 3.2 2.2 4.5 
         Source: OECD statistics, Statistics Iceland. 
 
The financial side of the economy presented a less favourable picture. Historically, most 
of the Icelandic economy was heavily regulated. Unlike its neighbouring countries, the 
regulations implemented during the Great Depression and World War-II lasted longer. The 
financial sector in particular was least developed where capital controls were in place for the 
most part of the century, an interest rate ceiling imposed by the central bank that made real 
interest rates negative for most of the 1970s, with credit rationing a key feature of state-
owned commercial banks. Perhaps as a result, corruption was rampant and the nature of the 
credit rationing and corruption then influenced the structure of the economy, including which 
companies and industries would thrive. Nominal interest rates were set by the Central Bank, 
which was controlled by the government (Danielsson and Zoega 2009). There were three 
                                                          
3 GDP per capita in 2010 dollars was 46,212 dollars in Iceland in 2017, 45,688 in Denmark, 39,504 in Finland 
and 45,486 in Sweden. Source: OECD. 
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governors, two of whom were political appointees. The authorities were not only responsible 
for some key interest rates but for the whole spectrum of rates, even dictating the manner of 
competition customers would experience (Jonsson 1999). The persistent inflationary pressure 
and the negative interest rates – caused by the ceiling on nominal rates – gradually made 
saving fall. With the exception of a few small institutions, the banking sector was mostly 
owned by the government, and was highly politicised in its operations as politicians were 
involved in the banks’ boards and lending decisions. As a means of political influence, capital 
was rationed between a few industries (mostly fishing, aluminium smelting and geothermal 
sectors) with vested interests, which resulted in a lack of investment in the sectors where 
credit was unavailable.  
Controls on the flow of capital into and out of the Icelandic capital were in effect for 
most of the 20th century. One has to go back to the Scandinavian Monetary Union from 1873 
to 1920 to find a period of free capital flows. Iceland issued a currency for the first time in 
1885 that was linked to the Danish Krona and backed by gold and hence also the currencies 
of Norway and Sweden. During this period, foreign capital financed the transformation of 
Iceland’s economy, which now started to use fishing vessels that were propelled by motor 
engines as well as the emergence of some small-scale industry. When Iceland became 
independent in 1918 the authorities decided to continue membership of the monetary union. 
But events made the demise of this union inevitable when the First World War created a 
persistent current account surplus for Sweden and a deficit for Norway and Denmark, 
Sweden being an important source of steel for the German war effort. These imbalances 
created a divergence between the market value of the Danish and Norwegian Krona, on the 
one hand, and Swedish Krona, on the other hand. The appreciation of the Swedish currency 
in a currency union where the Swedish central bank had to keep the exchange rate viz-a-viz 
the Danish and Norwegian Krona unchanged created arbitrage opportunities when investors 
could buy the latter in the currency market and sell to the Swedish central bank. This caused 
the supply of Swedish Krona to expand which made the system unsustainable and it collapsed 
in 1918. During the war the real exchange rate in Iceland increased due to an increase in the 
foreign price of fish but the export price fell at the end of the war leaving the country with a 
large current account deficit that triggered a currency devaluation. 
Iceland fixed its exchange rate to Sterling in 1925, and hence indirectly to gold. But real 
wages increased until 1930 because of internal deflation and constant nominal wages. This 
created problems when the price of Iceland’s exports fell further in the Great Depression. 
This required a fall in the real exchange rate, which could only occur through a fall of 
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nominal wages. But due to strikes and union opposition this turned out not to be feasible. 
While the British decision to abandon the Gold Standard in 1931 helped Iceland reduce its 
external imbalance, this was not sufficient and the authorities imposed capital controls that 
entailed both controls on capital flows as well as trade in goods and services. These capital 
controls were in effect for decades afterwards. Controls on imports lasted until 1959. 
Controls on capital flows lasted until 1994. 
Authorities in Iceland were sceptical about the merits of competition and free markets, 
but there always existed a fraction of the population that supported the introduction of free 
markets. The process of liberalisation started in the 1960s, when Iceland relaxed capital 
controls on the current account so that imports were freed up while controls were still in 
effect when it came to capital flows. The country joined GATT in 1964, lowered trade 
barriers and substantially reduced subsidies to the fishing industry.4 In 1969 the first 
aluminium smelter was built in Iceland as a way of diversifying the economy. Despite some 
important steps towards liberalization, the exchange rate was still decided by the government 
and banks were still state-owned. In general, the tight hold of the government on the 
economy remained to a large extent unaffected (Gylfason et al., 2010) and there was 
widespread financial repression.  
In the late 1970s, more important steps were taken to liberalise the economy. Thus, 
financial indexation was legalized in 1979 (Gylfason et al 2010). Jonsson (1999) argues that 
allowing financial indexation encouraged saving by making real interest rates positive and 
reduced the distortion of the real economy caused by unequal access to cheap capital. 
Financial indexation also wiped out unprofitable firms and industries that previously relied on 
credit rationing.  
The economy experienced a wave of liberalisation in the early 1990s and Iceland joined 
the European Single Market in 1994 with the effect that capital now moved freely into and 
out of the country. The 1990s brought capital inflows, a domestic credit expansion and a 
booming stock market. These ended in a sudden stop, a fall in the exchange rate and a fall of 
the stock market in 2001. Because the banks were state owned at the time the magnitude of 
the inflows was manageable, the reversal in 2001 did not cause a systemic crisis.  
Because the allocation of capital by state-owned banks was both corrupt and inefficient, 
there were several attempts to privatise the state-owned banks. The objective of the 
                                                          
4 The fishing industry prior to the reduction in subsidies was absorbing more than 40 percent of government 
expenditures. 
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privatisation drive was to allocate capital more efficiently, reduce interest rate margins, and 
provide a better environment for saving. In the following two years, that is 2002 and 2003, 
the country’s banks were privatised. Iceland’s integration into the European Single Market 
allowed the banks to open branches in other countries and borrow from foreign banks, subject 
to EU regulations. The mixture of private banks, capital mobility and low risk premium in 
international capital markets brought unprecedented speculation. In addition, the commercial 
banks borrowed amounts directly from European banks that dwarfed the GDP of the country. 
In effect the privatization of the banking system involved the privatization of the state’s credit 
rating which was AAA at the beginning of the decade. Each of the three banks was deemed to 
be too big to fail and this made it possible for them to borrow from European banks as well as 
issue bonds at low interest rates. The borrowing was then used to fund the acquisition of 
foreign businesses by Icelandic firms, the latter often owned by people close to the three 
banks.  
The combination of a floating exchange rate regime and capital mobility turned out to 
present challenges for the Icelandic central bank. Foreign borrowing created a domestic 
expansion and a tight labor market that called for higher interest rates. The central bank 
policy rate increased gradually from 2004 to 2008, reaching a height of 15.5% in the summer 
of 2008. But due to European Union regulations and a lack of proper macro-prudential 
regulation, the domestic banks were allowed to make loans in foreign currencies to unhedged 
households, firms and local communities. The wedge between domestic and foreign interest 
rates turned out to be too large to resist. Thus 80% of non-financial business debt was in 
foreign currencies and 20% of household debt in 2008. In addition, foreign investors started 
to issue bonds in the Icelandic currency to profit from the interest rate differential and the 
appreciation of the currency. This hot money inflow amounted to 37% of GDP in the middle 
of 2008.  
Figure 1 shows that a large proportion of inflows into Iceland were speculative, taking 
the form of portfolio investments (PFI) and other investments (OI), while the proportion of 
FDI remained smaller in the first years of liberalisation. There was an increase in FDI in 
Iceland during 2006-08, where a large proportion of investment was in export projects (e.g., 
aluminum smelting).  
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 Figure 1. Composition of capital inflows and share prices 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland 
 
The capital inflow raised the exchange rate and generated a stock market- and a housing 
market boom. Stock prices increased by 35 per cent per year and house prices by 12 per cent 
per year.5 Consumption and investment increased at a rapid rate and the current account 
deficit averaged 14 per cent from 2003 to 2008. Unemployment fell below 3%. Gross foreign 
debt grew from a stable level of about 60 percent of GDP in the 1990s to nearly 700 percent.  
The phase of free capital mobility, generating a credit boom from 2004 to 2008, ended 
when inflows suddenly stopped in the fall of 2008, as shown in Figure 1. When world 
financial markets started to freeze up in 2007-2008 the carry trade unwound rapidly, causing 
the currency to depreciate. This depreciation raised the domestic currency value of business 
and household debt, making most businesses on the island technically insolvent. As a result, 
the banks were insolvent and their liquidity problems – aggravated by a lack of a lender of 
last resort in foreign currencies – caused them to fail in October 2008. Iceland faced a 
systematic crisis which included a temporary collapse of the international payments system. 
The domestic payments system also faced difficulties but functioned throughout the crisis as 
noted by Danielsson and Zoega (2009). The collapse thus brought about a perfect storm of a 
currency crisis, rising inflation and unemployment and a failed banking system. The sudden 
stop of the capital inflows caused the currency to lose half of its value, the price of imports 
surged and the fall in imports and investment made the current account go from a deficit to a 
                                                          
5 The OMX15 covering the 15 largest corporations increased six-fold over the same period and nearly by a 
factor of nine from its bottom in 2001 to its peak value in 2007. See Aliber (2011) and Halldorsson and Zoega 
(2010). 
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surplus in 2009. Stock prices fell by 95% and house prices plummeted.6 Due to the 
prevalence of foreign currency loans, the exchange rate depreciation made large sections of 
the economy insolvent. 
Iceland sought the help of the IMF and with the IMF’s assistance an economic program 
was implemented by the authorities. The program consisted of a plan for monetary policy, 
fiscal policy and the restructuring of the banking system. To shore up the currency, interest 
rates were increased to very high levels – the policy rate was increased to 18% in November 
2008 and was then gradually lowered in subsequent years. Capital controls were used to reign 
in the outflows so that interest rates would not have to be raised further. As a response to the 
currency crisis the IMF and the government imposed capital controls in November 2008, in 
effect prohibiting all capital outflows but permitting current account transactions, thereby 
allowing investors to convert interest revenue from local-currency investments into foreign 
currency. As a result of the capital controls, significant amounts of foreign capital, in the 
form of ISK-denominated assets, remained in Iceland. These capital controls differed from 
those in effect from 1930 to 1960 in that there were no restrictions on the imports of foreign 
goods and services, while the capital account was shut down and only the paying of interest 
and the principal of existing foreign debt was permitted. 
Fiscal policy was expansionary in the years after the collapse as the automatic stabilizers 
were allowed to have an effect, but the deficit was gradually reduced. Meanwhile the 
authorities created a new banking system by effectively cutting off the banks’ foreign 
operations and putting them into receivership while recapitalizing the domestic operations 
under a new name. A recovery started in the middle of 2010. Real GDP has at the time of this 
writing increased beyond its peak in 2007, unemployment is currently around 4% and the 
current account has been in surplus in every year since 2009. The capital controls were 
removed in 2017 and there remains only a special reserve requirement that applies to the 
buying of listed, domestic bonds by foreign residents intended to prevent the re-emergence of 
the carry trade. The crisis, in other words, has passed.  
In what follows, we explore the relationship between saving and investment from 1960 
to 2016 during which there were capital controls from 1960 to 1994, then capital mobility 
until 2008 and capital controls under crisis conditions from 2018 to 2016. We formulate our 
analysis in the framework of the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) study.  
 
                                                          
6 Source: Registers Iceland (skra.is/Markadurinn/Talnaefni). 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
After relying heavily on international capital for financing its mainly foreign investments in 
the years preceding the crisis, Iceland operated in a regime of heavily restricted capital 
mobility from 2008 to 2016. The implementation of capital controls following a sudden stop 
made domestic savings the only source of financing for economic growth as well as for 
servicing what remained of foreign debt. Against this background, we investigate how the 
aforementioned regimes of capital mobility affected the relationship between domestic saving 
and investment in Iceland, and what implications it may have for economic growth and the 
balance of payments in general. In particular, we analyze how the economic effects of recent 
capital controls (imposed as we mentioned above in response to a sudden stop) differed from 
those capital controls that historically prevailed prior to 1994.  
 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
To investigate the relationship between investment and saving under different capital-flow 
regimes in Iceland, we use annual historical data from 1960 to 2016. The data are taken from 
Statistics Iceland. Our sample covers three main regimes of capital mobility as shown in 
Figure 2. Both saving and investment follow a similar downward trend, indicating the 
possiblity of a long-run relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Saving and Investment in Iceland 
  
Source: Statistics Iceland. 
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Saving has been considerably lower than investment in Iceland until the crisis of 2008. 
Thus there was a persistent current account deficit but, because of economic growth, the ratio 
of external debt to GDP did not explode. The gap between the two series began to increase 
during the era of free capital mobility that started with Iceland’s membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) in 1994. In the first years of free capital mobility, there was a 
relatively moderate increase in the saving-investment gap, which was the result of a capital 
inflow boom which ended in a sudden stop in 2001. This episode of boom and bust was of a 
relatively smaller scale as discussed in section 2. During 2004-08, there was a much larger 
divergence between the two variables, which was the direct effect of the international 
expansion of the banking sector that attracted large capital inflows. During this phase, saving 
kept on falling whereas investment increased very agressively, resulting in large deficits on 
the current account. The period of free capital mobility temporarily ended with the 
introduction of capital controls during the financial crisis of 2008, which lasted until March 
2017. During the 2008 crisis, investment collapsed and remained low in the first period of 
capital controls whereas saving increased, resulting in higher saving than investment for the 
first time in the available statistics. 
We now proceed to exploring the relationship between domestic saving and investment, 
known as the Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis using historical data covering different regimes of 
capital mobility as discussed above. We estimate the following long-run model. 
                         𝐼𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                       (1) 
where 𝐼𝑡 represents the investment to GDP ratio, 𝑆𝑡 represents the saving to GDP ratio, 𝛼0 is 
the intercept, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term in the model. With perfect capital mobility across 
countries, we would find the coefficient 𝛽1 to be close to zero, indicating changes in saving in 
one country do not affect interest rates or investment in that country. 7 FH found that the 
coefficient of the saving rate was 0.887 in a cross section of industrialized countries for the 
period 1960 and 1974. They attributed the finding to barriers in capital mobility.8 
                                                          
7 There is now a very large empirical literature investigating the FH hypothesis. For a survey see, Apergis and 
Tsoumas (2009) and Kumar and Bhaskara (2009).  
8 A variety of explanations have been proposed for the FH puzzle. Coakley et al. (1996) argue that large and 
persistent current account deficits may reduce access to international capital markets. According to Tobin (1983) 
and Summers (1988), governments may try to avoid deficits for financial stability as well as surpluses. 
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Following the econometric approach used in Narayan (2005) and Abbott and Vita (2003), 
we analyse the S-I correlation for different regimes by estimating the model in equation (1) for 
different samples. We perform three main sets of estimations as follows: 
 
i) First, we estimate the model for 1960-1994, only covering the period of restricted 
capital mobility. 
ii) We then add the phase of free capital mobility corresponding to the period 1994-
2008. However, the phase of capital mobility includes two different monetary 
regimes. There was an adjustable peg from 1994 to 2001 and then a floating 
regime with inflation targeting. While our focus remains on understanding the 
effects of capital mobility regimes on the saving-investment correlation, we 
supplement our analysis by investigating how the correlation was affected by 
moving from an adjustable peg to a floating exchange rate regime within the free 
capital mobility regime. 
iii) Finally, we include the phase of post-crisis capital controls in our sample, and 
estimate the model for the whole sample using sample 1960-2016.  
 
The estimation across different regimes of capital mobility allows us to investigate the 
effects of these regimes on the saving investment correlation. As shown in Frankel (1992) and 
explored by Katsimi and Zoega (2016), a zero correlation between saving and investment 
implies real interest parity. The real interest rate differential can be written as: 
(𝑟 − 𝜋𝑒) −  (𝑟∗ − 𝜋𝑒∗) = (𝑟 − 𝑟∗ − 𝑓𝑑) +  (𝑓𝑑 − ∆𝑠𝑒) + (∆𝑠𝑒 − (𝜋𝑒 − 𝜋𝑒∗))     (2) 
where 𝑟 and 𝑟∗ denote domestic and foreign nominal interest rates, 𝜋𝑒  and 𝜋𝑒∗ are the 
domestic and foreign expected rates of inflation, fd is the forward discount rate on the 
domestic currency and ∆𝑠𝑒 is the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. The first 
term on the right hand side of equation (2) is the covered interest differential and is defined 
by Frankel (1992) as the 'country premium', since it captures country-specific factors that 
may not allow real interest rate differential such as capital controls or default risk. The second 
and third terms represent the exchange risk premium and the expected real depreciation, and 
together they form the 'currency premium'. Clearly the membership of the EEA could be 
expected to decrease the country premium by making the imposition of capital controls less 
likely. However, in the case of Iceland, the currency premium would be unaffected since the 
country never joined the Eurozone. Thus we expect the country premium to have fallen in 
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1994 when Iceland joined the European single market as one of the member countries of the 
European Economic Area. The country premium would then have increased markedly in 
2008 when the banking system collapsed, the currency tanked and capital controls were 
imposed. 
Before estimating the long-run model in equation (1), we need to determine whether a 
long-run relationship between saving and investment exists. We do so by using cointegration 
tests, which require testing the variables for stationarity and determining their orders of 
integration. We test the data for stationarity by using the traditional Augmented Dicky Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests. However, a weakness of both these tests is that 
the result might be contaminated by the presence of a structural break in the series. In other 
words, the presence of a structural break might manifest itself as non-stationarity in the data, 
leading to false inferences. We therefore extend our analysis to the unit root structural break 
test by implementing Zivot and Andrews (1992), which accounts for an endogenous 
structural break in the model. There are three versions of Zivot and Andrews (hereafter ZA); 
‘Model A’ allows for a break in the intercept, ‘Model B’ allows for the break in trend, and 
‘Model C’ allows for a break in both the intercept and trend. There is no consensus on which 
version is preferable. We implement Model C for completeness.  
The ZA model with a dummy for the shift in mean and trend (originally referred to as 
‘Model C’ by ZA) is represented as follows.  
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑡 +  𝜃1𝐷𝑈𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+  𝜀𝑡                              (3) 
where ∆ is the lag operator, 𝜀𝑡 is a white noise term, t is the time index (t=1,..., T). 𝐷𝑈𝑡 in the 
model is a dummy for a shift in mean at a potential break point TB, and 𝐷𝑇𝑡 is a dummy for 
the shift in trend, where 𝐷𝑈𝑡 = 1 and 𝐷𝑇𝑡 = 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵 if t>TB and zero otherwise. 
 
Testing for a long-run relationship 
After testing the variables for a unit root, we proceed to testing for the existence of a long-run 
relationship between saving and investment. If both variables are found to be stationary at 
first-differences, i.e., if they both have I(1) order of integration, we use a residuals-based test 
for cointegration, in which the residuals of the model in equation (1) are simply tested for 
stationarity. If the residuals are found to be stationary, this simply implies that the linear 
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combination of the variables is stationary and they share a long-run path.9 Since, the 
residuals-based test is only valid when the variables have a unit root and the order of 
integration is similar, we therefore supplement our analysis by using ARDL bounds test of 
cointegration, which is relatively more flexible. This approach allows us to test for a long-run 
relationship irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. 
Nonetheless, studying integration properties of the variables is still essential to ensure that the 
series are not I(2), in which case the test is invalid.10  
The ARDL bounds test is represented as follows:     
∆𝐼𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝜃1𝐼𝑡−1 +  𝜃2𝑆𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=1
∆𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=0
∆𝑆𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡                                       (4) 
where 𝜃1 and 𝜃1 represent long-run relationships, while 𝛾𝑖and 𝛽𝑘 represent the short-run 
dynamics of the model and Δ is the first difference operator. Standard Wald test and F-test 
are used to test the null hypothesis, 𝐻0: 𝜃1=𝜃2=0, which indicates no cointegration between 
the variables. The alternative hypothesis, 𝐻1: 𝜃1≠𝜃2≠0, implies the presence of a long-run 
relationship between the variables. We compare the F-statistics with the set of critical values 
(i.e. lower and upper bounds) provided by Narayan (2005) for small samples. If the F-statistic 
is larger than the upper bound, we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration and conclude 
that the regressors are purely I(1). In the presence of cointegration, the long-run coefficient 
on saving is represented by -(
𝜃1
𝜃2
). If the F-statistic is smaller than the lower bound, we accept 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, while the result is inconclusive if the F-statistics lies 
between the two bounds. 
If there exists a long-run relationship between saving and investment, we estimate the 
long-run coefficients using simple OLS, Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS), and Dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) models, along with obtaining both the short-run and long-run coefficients within the 
ARDL framework. Both FMOLS and DOLS estimation strategies are generally preferred 
over simple OLS as they tend to eliminate endogeneity and serial correlation, and have also 
proven to provide robust results in small samples. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Conversely, non-stationarity of the residuals implies that the variables do not share a common long-run path. 
10 See Pesaran et al (2001) for a detailed discussion. 
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3.2 Results and discussion 
The results of the PP and ADF test in the case of all four samples (see Table A1 in appendix) 
suggest that both investment and saving are non-stationary at the 1% significance level. The 
results of the ZA test are reported in Table 2 as follows: 
 
Table 2. Unit root structural break test (ZA: Model C) 
 
Investment Saving 
Sample  1960-1994  1960-2001  1960-2008  1960-2016  1960-1994  1960-2001  1960-2008  1960-2016 
 Break point 1972 1976 1991 2002 1981 1981 2000 2007 
𝜃1 6.48*** 
(1.50) 
2.57 
(2.81) 
-2.60 
(1.66) 
6.12*** 
(1.95) 
-4.51*** 
(1.34) 
-6.32*** 
(1.58) 
6.32*** 
(1.85) 
-12.07** 
(2.03) 
𝛾1 -1.03*** 
(0.30) 
0.34*** 
(0.18) 
0.70*** 
(0.18) 
-0.50** 
(0.22) 
0.01 
0.13 
0.08 
(0.08) 
-1.30*** 
(0.33) 
3.02*** 
(0.45) 
Test-statistics -6.57(4) -3.70(0) -4.85(1) -4.70(1) -4.68(0) -5.04(1) -4.10(0) -3.89(0) 
Critical values  
   
 
  
1% -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 -5.57 
5% -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 -5.08 
10% -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 -4.82 
Note: Null hypothesis is that series has a unit root. Numbers in the brackets with the T-statistics represent the lags.  
 
Using ZA test, we find sufficient evidence to argue that investment and saving exhibit 
unit roots in general. The only result going in the other direction is found in the case of 
investment using the sample period 1960-1994 when ZA indicates stationarity of the series in 
levels while PP and ADF on the other hand indicate the presence of a unit root. Although the 
result in this particular case is inconclusive, it is a well-established empirical fact that 
investment exhibits a unit root and is integrated of order one, i.e. I(1) (e.g., Bajo-Rubio 
(1998); Oh et al (1999); Abbott and Vita (2003); Narayan (2005)). Furthermore, the findings 
of all the tests are similar in rejecting the presence of a unit root when implemented in the 
case of first order differences, supporting the argument that the data are I(1). Based on this 
evidence, we proceed to testing the model for the existence of a long-run relationship. First, 
we estimate ARDL model in equation (4), using the Akaike Information criterion (AIC) for 
the lag-selection, and test for the existence of a long-run relationship. The results indicate the 
presence of a long-run relationship between saving and investment as shown in Table 3. The 
ARDL bounds test indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 1% for 
all four samples. Second, we test the model for a long-run relationship using residuals based 
test. The residuals of the models for the four samples are stationary at 1% significance level, 
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indicating strong evidence of a long-run relationship between the two variables. Thus, we 
proceed to estimating the long-run relationships in the next section.11 
 
  Table 3. Cointegration tests 
ARDL bounds test 
 1960-1994 
1960-2001 1960-2008 1960-2016 
F-statistic 9.42 7.70 6.61 8.80 
Critical Value Bounds 
 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
1% 5.76 6.48 5.59 6.33 5.50 6.24 5.37 6.04 
5% 3.95 4.53 3.93 4.52 3.86 4.44 3.79 4.93 
10% 3.22 3.75 3.21 3.86 3.17 3.65 3.14 3.67 
Residual based test 
T-statistics -4.82*** -3.90*** -4.86*** -4.74*** 
        Note: *** denotes that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the residuals can be rejected at 
1% significance level. For residual based test, the two samples 1960-2008 and 1960-2016 
include a crisis dummy.           
 
Long-run relationships  
The long-run coefficients for DOLS and FMOLS reported in Table 4a whereas the results for 
ARDL and OLS are reported in Table 4b. Note that Table 4b reports the long-run coefficients 
for ARDL and OLS as well as the short-run dynamics associated with the ARDL method. 
Overall, the long-run coefficients are consistent across the four methods. The results 
indicate that the S-I correlation is stronger during the period of restricted capital mobility 
(1960-1994) than the period of free capital mobility (1960-2008). The correlation has a clear 
tendency to fall during periods of free capital mobility. In particular, when we include the 
first years of free capital mobility under adjustable peg regime, the correlation weakens. And 
when we include the entire phase of free capital mobility, the correlation weakens further. 
Our analysis up to this point in the sample confirms the FH hypothesis that the correlation 
depends on capital mobility. This result is consistent with that of Katsimi and Zoega (2016) 
who studied the correlation between saving and investment for member countries of the 
European Single Market. 
                                                          
11 Throughout our empirical analysis, we include a dummy for the potential break points in our models as 
indicated by ZA test. We only keep the dummy in the model, if found to be statistically significant. 
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However, the correlation does not increase when the period of capital controls after the 
crisis is included, contradicting the FH hypothesis in this case. This implies that the 
relationship between saving and investment in capital controls after the crisis tends to be 
weaker than in capital controls in normal times.  
 
Table 4a: FMOLS and DOLS estimates 
 
FMOLS DOLS 
 1960-1994 1960-2001 1960-2008 1960-2016 1960-1994 1960-2001 1960-2008 1960-2016 
𝑆𝑡  
 
1.25*** 
(0.15) 
1.21*** 
(0.17) 
1.29*** 
(0.15) 
0.71*** 
(0.14) 
1.29*** 
(0.15) 
1.25*** 
(0.14) 
1.02*** 
(0.22) 
0.94*** 
(0.15) 
Constant 
 
-0.35 
(3.46) 
0.44 
(3.83) 
-1.13 
(3.46) 
11.25*** 
(3.04) 
-1.13 
(3.46) 
-0.29 
(3.09) 
4.25 
(4.81) 
6.79** 
(3.13) 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
As an additional check, the weak correlation is also confirmed by using two conventional 
approaches. First, we include an interacting dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
(otherwise zero) when Iceland switched from a regime of free capital mobility to a regime of 
capital controls in 2008 (see Table A3 in the appendix). Second, we estimate the model for 
every regime separately by creating three sub-periods, i.e., restricted capital mobility (1960-1994), 
free capital mobility (1995-2008), and capital controls (2009-2016), see Table A4 in the appendix.12 
The results in all cases indicate that despite strong capital controls in the post-crisis period, 
the saving-investment correlation is much weaker as compared to the correlation in the earlier 
restricted period of capital mobility.  
The lower part of Table 4b reports the short-run dynamics of ARDL model along with 
the speed of adjustment (i.e. error correction term, ECT). During the period of restricted 
capital mobility (1960-1994), short-run deviations (due to shocks) between saving and 
investment are corrected by 56% in the next year (i.e. the model converges to its long-run 
path in 2 years). Overall, the ECT for the phase of free capital mobility (1960-2008) is lower 
than the period of restricted capital mobility (1960-1994). The speed of adjustment drops yet 
further when the period of capital controls after the crisis is included. 
 
                                                          
12 Note that the results in Table A4 are only based on simple OLS with no lags. Due to less no. of observations 
in free capital mobility and capital control regime, it is not possible to estimate a model with lags.  
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Table 4b: ARDL and OLS estimates 
 
ARDL OLS 
 1960-
1994 
1960-
2001 
1960-2008 
1960-
2016 
1960-
1994 
1960-
2001 
1960-2008 1960-2016 
𝑆𝑡 1.35*** 
(0.22) 
1.25*** 
(0.14) 
1.05*** 
(0.22) 
0.92*** 
(0.19) 
1.03*** 
(0.14) 
1.02*** 
(0.12) 
0.74*** 
(0.14) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
Constant -2.93 
(2.63) 
-0.79 
(3.13) 
4.44 
(4.81) 
7.24* 
(4.00) 
4.71 
(3.27) 
4.92* 
(2.71) 
11.43*** 
(2.99) 
11.08*** 
(2.58) 
Dummy 
      
11.36*** 
(5.24) 
11.81** 
(5.61) 
Short-run elasticities 
ECT -0.56*** 
(0.09) 
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.37*** 
(0.09) 
-0.33*** 
(0.06)    
 
∆𝑆𝑡 -0.09 
(0.24) 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
-0.24* 
(0.13) 
-0.18 
(0.11)    
 
∆𝑆𝑡−1 -0.39*** 
(0.14) 
-0.36** 
(0.18) 
-0.35* 
(0.18)     
 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
For OLS estimations, the two samples 1960-2008 and 1960-2016 included a crisis dummy.           
 
Note that the speed of convergence towards a long-run equilibrium tends to lower as the 
saving-investment correlation becomes weaker, which in other words indicates a prolonged 
period of divergence between saving and investment. This finding chimes with our discussion 
of the recent history of Iceland in section 2 above. 
Effects of capital controls in normal times and during the crisis 
We now focus on explaining the different effects of capital controls on the saving investment 
correlation in the “normal” 1960-1994 and the crisis period 2008 to 2016. In the era of 
restricted capital mobility (1960-1994), there was credit rationing leading to a stronger 
relationship between saving and investment in the economy since there was an external 
constraint on the current account due to limited access to foreign capital. This external 
constraint, in effect the result of imperfect mobility of capital, forced saving to be close to 
investment over time. In contrast, there was a weak relationship between saving and 
investment in the early phase of post-crisis capital controls. We can broadly identify three 
major factors, leading to a weak saving investment correlation during the post-crisis capital 
controls. 
First, as a result of the high interest rates, damaged balance sheets and general 
uncertainty about the future, investment was low for a number of years until the economy 
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started to recover while saving was high due to the same factors. This made the two series 
diverge, leading to a weak correlation between saving and investment despite capital controls. 
The difference between saving and investment was used to pay off foreign debt. The post-
crisis divergence in the two series can also be seen in Figure 2. In Iceland, the saving to GDP 
ratio went from 3.11% in 2008 to 20.34% in 2014, while investment to GDP went from 25% 
in 2008 to 16% in 2014. No such deleveraging occurred during the earlier period of capital 
controls.  
Second, the financial system of the country collapsed and the wave of bankruptcies also 
transmitted shocks to the balance sheets of many firms. There was no stable financial system 
in place that could have efficiently facilitated credit intermediation channelling savings to 
investment projects. Also, during the financial restructuring of insolvent firms kept 
investment from growing. 
Third, restructuring the financing of investment projects and the setting up of new 
projects required time. In addition, there was increasing international pressure from the 
creditors who needed to be repaid.13 This is typical of a crisis situation, when all negative 
forces gain momentum at the same time, making the recovery path difficult and keeping 
investment down, especially when uncertainty is highest.  
The causes of the breakdown of the saving-investment correlation in a post-crisis period 
can be generalised to other countries and periods. The crisis affects balance sheets and 
financial intermediation adversely and creates uncertainty. These factors tend to raise saving 
and reduce investment.14 It follows that merely implementing strong capital controls in 
response to a crisis is not sufficient to channel increased saving into investment and promote 
economic growth. A second instrument is needed, which is an independent monetary policy. 
Without the ability to lower interest rates it is difficult to find ways to channel saving into 
investments to facilitate economic recovery.15 Thus capital controls that prevent a currency 
from depreciating and are not accompanied by falling interest rates come at a greater cost of 
falling aggregate demand that has negative consequences for growth. In contrast, a country 
with its own currency can better afford to use capital controls to its advantage. Here the 
capital controls affect the level of the exchange rate while the central bank interest rates 
affect domestic consumption and investment. 
                                                          
13 This pressure tends to be stronger in countries without sovereign currencies, making them bow to the demand 
of international creditors as was the case in some eurozone countries. In most eurozone countries, the current 
account balances have rebounded but the economies experienced longer recessions. 
14 See Zoega (2010), amongst others. 
15 See Raza et al. (2018b) for the comparison of economic recovery in Iceland and Ireland. 
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 Iceland’s experience in the later years of capital controls provides a good example. The 
central bank started lowering interest rates in 2011-2012 from a very high level step by step, 
which facilitated the recovery of investment without having any major impacts on the 
exchange rate due to the capital controls. 
One key lesson from the Iceland crisis is that two instruments are required in the post-
crisis environment to achieve the two goals of non-inflationary demand growth and stable 
exchange rates. Capital controls and higher interest rates after the crisis helped stabilise the 
economy in the short run – the subsequent lowering of rates helped foster the recovery of the 
economy, while the capital controls reduced the volatility of the exchange rate.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We have explored the relationship between saving and investment using Icelandic data in 
order to test for the effect of capital mobility on the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient. Following 
a review of the performance of the Icelandic economy over the last century, we found that 
institutional changes, in particular Iceland’s entry into the European Single Market in 1994, 
coincided with a fall in the long-run correlation between saving and investment as well as the 
short-run speed of adjustment, as measured by the error correction term. This confirms the 
interpretation of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that a positive value of the coefficient of 
saving in an investment equation reflects the effect of limited capital mobility. However, the 
reintroduction of capital controls in 2008 neither increased the long-run correlation nor the 
error correction term due to the effect of the financial crisis and the ensuing currency crisis 
that forced Iceland to run persistent current account surpluses to pay back foreign loans. 
Thus, capital controls in response to a financial crisis can have a very different effect on the 
saving-investment correlation than capital controls in a more stable environment. 
Further research is required to understand precisely how the presence of capital controls 
affects the saving/investment relationship for larger economies, and for economies within 
larger currency areas, such as Cyprus and Greece. The interaction of capital controls and 
current account surplus targets, in particular, should be investigated.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Philip-Perron Test 
 
Investment Saving 
Sample 
1960-
1994 
1994-
2001 
1960-
2008 
1960-
2016 
1960-
1994 
1960-
2001 
1960-
2008 
1960-
2016 
Test-
statistics -1.02 
 
-1.77 -2.19 -2.31 -1.59 
-1.91 
-0.16 -1.98 
 Critical values 
 
1% -3.63 -3.60 -3.57 -3.55 -3.63 -3.60 -3.57 -3.55 
5% -2.95 -2.93 -2.92 -2.91 -2.95 -2.93 -2.92 -2.91 
10% -2.61 -2.60 -2.59 -2.59 -2.61 -2.60 -2.59 -2.59 
 
 Table A2. ADF test 
 
Investment Saving 
Sample 1960-1994 
1994-
2001 
1960-
2008 
1960-
2016 
1960-
1994 
1960-
2001 
1960-
2008 
1960-
2016 
Test-
statistics 
-1.15 -1.82 -2.22 -2.15 -1.66 -0.73 -0.76 -1.98 
Critical values 
1% -3.63 -3.61 -3.57 -3.55 -3.63 -3.61 -3.57 -3.55 
5% -2.95 -2.94 -2.92 -2.91 -2.95 -2.94 -2.92 -2.91 
10% -2.61 -2.60 -2.59 -2.59 -2.61 -2.60 -2.59 -2.59 
 
   Table A3. Long-run estimates allowing for regime shift 
 ARDL DOLS FMOLS OLS 
 0.92*** 
(0.18) 
1.15*** 
(0.12) 
0.94*** 
(0.12) 
0.78*** 
(0.09) 
𝑆𝑡*PCC 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.17) 
-0.37*** 
(0.12) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
Dummy 
6.61* 
(3.75) 
15.22*** 
(3.23) 
13.59*** 
(3.28) 
11.96*** 
(2.43) 
Constant 
7.31* 
(4.10) 
2.39*** 
(2.72) 
6.89*** 
(2.74) 
10.28*** 
(2.00) 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. PCC (dummy for Post-crisis Capital Controls) 
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        Table A4. Long-run estimates for each regime using simple OLS 
 1960-1994 1995-2008 2009-2016 
𝑆𝑡 
1.03*** 
(0.14) 
-0.46 
(0.29) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
Constant 
4.71 
(3.27) 
31.45*** 
(4.80) 
12.67*** 
(0.98) 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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